

# Current status on PQC

A brief overview on the status of quantum-safe standardization processes, upcoming standards and protocols

# Introduction

- update on what to expect during next year
- Questions: drop me an email (elfy@riseup.net, PGP-FP: 0x41B77C52D9DDB5D9) or write me via Matrix (@elfy:possum.city)
- slides for download at <https://elfy.dev/static/37c3-pqc-lightning.pdf>

Disclaimer: I'm not an academical cryptography expert, I'm doing cyber IT/OT security at my dayjob (DB Systel) and PQC is currently a part of it

# Upcoming standards: FIPS (NIST)

Purpose	FIPS Standard Drafts	Standard Name	Algorithm Name
Key Encapsulation	<a href="#">FIPS 203</a>	Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard ( <i>ML-KEM</i> )	CRYSTALS-Kyber
Signing	<a href="#">FIPS 204</a>	Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard ( <i>ML-DSA</i> )	CRYSTALS-Dilithium
Signing	<a href="#">FIPS 205</a>	Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard ( <i>SLH-DSA</i> )	SPHINCS+

- third signing algorithm (Falcon) will be released in Summer 2024 by NIST
- additional signing algorithms (*Onramp Submissions*) by NIST:
  - [40 candidate algorithms](#) announced in July 2023, currently in review (round 1)
  - final standards expected in several years

# Upcoming standards and protocols: IETF

- **TLS 1.3:** [draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-09 - Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3](#)
- **SSH:**  
[draft-josefsson-ntruprime-ssh-02 - Secure Shell \(SSH\) Key Exchange Method Using Hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime sntrup761 and X25519 with SHA-512: sntrup761x25519-sha512](#)  
and  
[draft-josefsson-ssh-mceliece-00 - Secure Shell Key Exchange Method Using Hybrid Classic McEliece and X25519 with SHA-512: mceliece6688128x25519-sha512](#)
- **IKEv2:**  
[raft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-01 - Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 \(IKEv2\)](#)
- several drafts wrt. **PKI and certificates** (e.g. [Composite Signatures For Use In Internet PKI](#) )
- Already standardized "older" stateful hash-based quantum-safe signature algorithms:
  - [RFC 8391 - XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme](#)
  - [RFC 8554 - Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures](#)
- Further information and helpful RFC drafts:
  - [GitHub - ietf-wg-pquip/state-of-protocols-and-pqc: A list of the state of IETF protocols and PQC](#)
  - [draft-ar-pquip-pqc-engineers-03 - Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers](#)
  - [draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-01 - Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes](#)

# Real-world usage of PQC

- OpenSSH sshd: [ntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid for KeyExchange](#) (beginning with OpenSSH 9.0 from Feb 2022)
- Rosenpass: [Wireguard add-on using Classic McEliece 460896 and Kyber-512 for hybrid PQ-security](#) (available since Feb 2023)
- Signal Messenger: [PQXDH \(Post-Quantum Extended Diffie-Hellman using a X25519/Kyber1024 hybrid\)](#) (available since Sep 2023)
- Google Chrome: [X25519Kyber768 hybrid for key agreement between Google Chrome and Google servers](#) (since Aug 2023)
- [GitHub - open-quantum-safe's liboqs C library for quantum-safe algorithms](#), a Python wrapper is also available
- many software products (both commercial and FOSS) are starting to implement NISTs draft algorithms, some are waiting until the standards are officially passed

# General Advice on PQC

- stay up to date
- use PQC where possible and go hybrid where you can
  - capture now, decrypt later attacks can be a problem for data which needs long-term security
  - know your infrastructure and locations/endpoints where (asymmetric) cryptography is in use
  - don't underestimate migration complexity and act as early as possible
- all general advice wrt. “classic” cryptography applies also to PQC

Thanks a lot and see you at 37c3!